﻿---
title: Execution via OpenClaw Agent
description: Detects suspicious child process execution from the OpenClaw, Moltbot, or Clawdbot AI coding agents running via Node.js. These tools can execute arbitrary...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/cross-platform/execution_openclaw_agent_child_process
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Execution via OpenClaw Agent
Detects suspicious child process execution from the OpenClaw, Moltbot, or Clawdbot AI coding agents running via Node.js.
These tools can execute arbitrary shell commands through skills or prompt injection attacks. Malicious skills from
public registries like ClawHub have been observed executing obfuscated download-and-execute commands targeting
cryptocurrency wallets and credentials. This rule identifies shells, scripting interpreters, and common LOLBins spawned
by these AI agents.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/01/clawdbots-rename-to-moltbot-sparks-impersonation-campaign](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/01/clawdbots-rename-to-moltbot-sparks-impersonation-campaign)](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/01/clawdbots-rename-to-moltbot-sparks-impersonation-campaign)
- [[https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/malicious-moltbot-skill-targets-crypto-users-on-clawhub](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/malicious-moltbot-skill-targets-crypto-users-on-clawhub)](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/malicious-moltbot-skill-targets-crypto-users-on-clawhub)
- [[https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/personal-ai-agents-like-openclaw-are-a-security-nightmare](https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/personal-ai-agents-like-openclaw-are-a-security-nightmare)](https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/personal-ai-agents-like-openclaw-are-a-security-nightmare)
- [[https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html](https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html)](https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- Domain: GenAI
- OS: Linux
- OS: macOS
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Execution
- Tactic: Command and Control
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Noise: High
- Performance: Normal
- Profile: Aggressive
- Threat: Living off the Land
- Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)
- Platform: Windows
- Platform: Linux
- Platform: macOS
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0053
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0108

**Version**: 5
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Execution via OpenClaw Agent

OpenClaw (formerly Clawdbot, rebranded to Moltbot) is a personal AI coding assistant that can execute shell commands
and scripts on behalf of users. Malicious actors have weaponized the skill ecosystem (ClawHub) to distribute skills
that execute download-and-execute commands, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.

### Possible investigation steps

- Verify if OpenClaw/Moltbot is an approved application in your organization.
- Review the child process command line for indicators of malicious activity (encoded payloads, remote downloads, credential access).
- Check the parent Node.js process command line to identify which OpenClaw component initiated the execution.
- Examine recently installed skills from ClawHub for malicious or obfuscated code.
- Correlate with network events to identify data exfiltration or C2 communication.
- Review the user's AI conversation history for prompt injection attempts.


### False positive analysis

- Developers legitimately using OpenClaw/Moltbot for AI-assisted coding may trigger this rule when the AI executes build scripts, curl commands, or other legitimate automation.
- If the tool is approved, consider tuning based on specific command patterns or adding exception lists.


### Response and remediation

- If the child process activity appears malicious, terminate the OpenClaw gateway and investigate the skill that initiated the command.
- Review and remove any suspicious skills from the OpenClaw configuration.
- If credentials may have been accessed, rotate affected secrets and API keys.
- Block known typosquat domains (moltbot.you, clawbot.ai, clawdbot.you) at the network level.


## Rule Query

```eql
process where event.type == "start" and
  process.parent.name : ("node", "node.exe") and 
  process.parent.command_line : ("*openclaw*", "*moltbot*", "*clawdbot*") and
   process.name : ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "bash.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "curl.exe", "curl", "base64", "xattr", "osascript", "python*", "chmod", "certutil.exe", "rundll32.exe") and
   not process.args in (
     "ip neigh show",
     "arp -a -n -l",
     "ip neighbor show dev wlan0",
     "ip neighbor show dev eth0",
     "arp -a | findstr /C:---"
   )
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Execution
  - Id: TA0002
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
  - Id: T1059
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: PowerShell
  - Id: T1059.001
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: AppleScript
  - Id: T1059.002
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Windows Command Shell
  - Id: T1059.003
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Unix Shell
  - Id: T1059.004
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Python
  - Id: T1059.006
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: JavaScript
  - Id: T1059.007
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Command and Control
  - Id: TA0011
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Application Layer Protocol
  - Id: T1071
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Web Protocols
  - Id: T1071.001
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
  - Id: T1105
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
  - Id: TA0005
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  - Id: T1140
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/)
- Technique:
  - Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
  - Id: T1218
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Rundll32
  - Id: T1218.011
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/)